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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-6205 
 
STANFORD SHANE; OTIS TERRELL; 
ROBERT STEWART, 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM FAUVER, Commissioner; 
JAMES BARBO, Administrator; 
ROGERS, Chief; DIRECTOR OF CUSTODY 
 
ON APPEAL FROM 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(Dist. Court No. 97-cv-03401) 
District Court Judge: Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. 
 
Argued: November 16, 1999 
 
Before: ALITO and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and 
FEIKENS,* Senior District Judge. 
 
(Filed: May 19, 2000) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
*The Honorable John Feikens, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation. 
  
       Jon Hogue (argued) 
       Hogue & Lannis 
       3400 Gulf Tower 
       Pittsburgh, PA 151219 
 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney 
        General of New Jersey 
       Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant 
        Attorney General of Counsel 
       Larry R. Etzweiler, Senior Deputy 
        Attorney General (argued) 
       R.J. Hughes Justice Complex 
       P.O. Box 112 
       Trenton, New Jersey 08625 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Stanford Shane, Otis Terrell, and Robert Stewart, 
prisoners at New Jersey's Northern State Prison, appeal the 
dismissal of their complaint under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
without leave to amend. We hold that, under the 
circumstances present here, Section 803(d) of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(c)(1), did 
not change the procedures that our court previously 
adopted regarding the dismissal of a complaint without 
granting leave to amend. We therefore vacate the order of 
dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs' complaint in this case asserted claims 
against three state correctional officials under the First, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, as well as under the New Jersey 
Constitution. Although proceeding pro se, the plaintiffs paid 
the full filing fee. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
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state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 
plaintiffs responded, and the District Court entered an 
order granting the motion and dismissing the complaint. 
Because the order did not specify that the dismissal was 
without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) the dismissal 
"operates as an adjudication upon the merits." The 
plaintiffs appealed. 
 
When the appeal was first considered by a panel of this 
court, that panel entered an order directing that counsel be 
appointed to represent the plaintiffs on appeal and 
instructing counsel to brief the issue whether the PLRA 
mandated the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims without 
leave to amend. New briefs were then filed by both sides, 
and the appeal was argued before this panel. 
 
Plaintiffs' counsel contends that the District Court should 
not have dismissed without giving leave to amend and, in 
any event, should not have dismissed with prejudice. The 
defendants respond that the manner in which the District 
Court disposed of the case was required by the PLRA. 
According to the defendants, if a complaint falling within 
the PLRA fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, the District Court must dismiss without leave to 
amend and with prejudice. 
 
II. 
 
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits 
a party to amend a pleading "once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served." A motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be made"before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b). Thus, in the typical case in which a defendant 
asserts the defense of failure to state a claim by motion, the 
plaintiff may amend the complaint once "as a matter of 
course" without leave of court. See 2 James Wm. Moore et 
al., Moore's Federal Practice S 12.34[5], at 12-76 (3d ed. 
1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). After amending once 
or after an answer has been filed, the plaintiff may amend 
only with leave of court or the written consent of the 
opposing party, but "leave shall be freely given when justice 
so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Supreme Court has 
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instructed that although "the grant or denial of an 
opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District 
Court, . . . outright refusal to grant the leave without any 
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise 
of discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion and 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
 
"Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to 
amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, 
prejudice, and futility." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Burlington"); 
Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1993). 
"Futility" means that the complaint, as amended, would fail 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1434. In assessing "futility," the 
District Court applies the same standard of legal sufficiency 
as applies under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.; 3 Moore's Federal 
Practice, supra S 15.15[3], at 15-47 to -48 (3d ed. 2000). 
Accordingly, if a claim is vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend, leave to amend 
generally must be granted unless the amendment would 
not cure the deficiency. 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the 
situation in which a deficiency in a complaint could be 
cured by amendment but leave to amend is not sought. 
Circuit case law, however, holds that leave to amend must 
be given in this situation as well. In Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976), this court stated that 
a district court should use the following procedure in 
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim: 
 
       [W]e suggest that district judges expressly state, where 
       appropriate, that the plaintiff has leave to amend 
       within a specified period of time, and that application 
       for dismissal of the action may be made if a timely 
       amendment is not forthcoming within that time. If the 
       plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an 
       appropriate notice with the district court asserting his 
       intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an 
       order to dismiss the action would be appropriate. 
 
Borelli, 532 F.2d at 951 n.1. In Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d 79 
(3d Cir. 1985), we stated: 
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       [T]his court has consistently held that when an 
       individual has filed a complaint under S 1983 which is 
       dismissable [sic] for lack of factual specificity, he 
       should be given a reasonable opportunity to cure the 
       defect, if he can, by amendment of the complaint and 
       that denial of an application for leave to amend under 
       these circumstances is an abuse of discretion. 
 
Darr, 767 F.2d at 81. 
 
These cases were followed by District Council 47 v. 
Bradley, 795 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1986), in which the court 
held that, if the complaint in that case was deficient, the 
District Court should have followed the procedure outlined 
in Borelli and granted leave to amend even though the 
plaintiff, which was represented by experienced counsel,1 
had never sought leave to amend. District Council 47, 795 
F.2d at 316. The court observed that "we have never 
required plaintiffs to request leave to amend following a 
district court's dismissal of a complaint." Id. If the rules set 
forth above are applied to this case, it is apparent that the 
District Court should not have dismissed the plaintiffs' 
claims without either granting leave to amend or 
concluding that any amendment would be futile. 
 
The defendants maintain, however, that the enactment of 
the PLRA altered these rules. The PLRA contains several 
provisions that address the dismissal of a complaint for 
failure to state a claim,2 but because the plaintiffs here did 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See District Council 47, 795 F.2d at 317 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
 
2. Section 805(a) of the PLRA requires a District Court to "screen" 
prisoner complaints "before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as 
soon as practicable after docketing," and provides that the Court "shall 
. . . dismiss" any portion of a complaint that, among other things, "fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. S 1915A(a)- 
(b). This provision does not apply to the present case because the 
complaint was not dismissed pursuant to court "screening" but on 
motion by the defendants. 
 
Section 804(a)(5) of the PLRA provides that in an in forma pauperis 
case, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 
determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which 
relief 
may be granted." 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2) (emphasis added). This is not an 
in forma pauperis case. 
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not proceed in forma pauperis and because their complaint 
was dismissed on motion by the defendants and not sua 
sponte by the court, only one of those provisions is 
applicable. We therefore focus our analysis on the effect of 
this provision and do not reach the other provisions that 
apply to sua sponte dismissals and in forma pauperis 
cases. 
 
The provision that applies here, PLRA S 803(d) provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
 
       The court shall . . . on the motion of a party dismiss 
       any action brought with respect to prison conditions 
       under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 
       law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
       correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the 
       action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
       granted. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
We think that the most natural reading of this language 
is that it simply restates the proposition that is implicit in 
Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., if a claim is based on facts that provide 
no basis for the granting of relief by the court, the claim 
must be dismissed. We acknowledge that the words of the 
statute do not foreclose the following, more expansive 
reading: if a complaint fails to state a claim for any reason, 
including a pleading error that could be cured by 
amendment, the court "shall . . . dismiss" forthwith and 
without permitting a curative amendment. But we believe 
that this reading is more strained and would produce 
results that we doubt Congress wanted. If "shall . . . 
dismiss" were interpreted to mean "shall dismiss forthwith 
and without permitting a curative amendment," it would 
seem that a court would be required to grant a motion to 
dismiss a technically defective claim even if a request for 
leave to amend to cure the defect were pending. We doubt 
that Congress wanted to require such a harsh, and 
seemingly pointless, result. We are also hesitant to 
conclude that Congress meant to change established 
procedures without a clearer indication than we have here. 
 
We are not aware of anything in the legislative history of 
the PLRA that weighs significantly against the conclusion 
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that we reach. There is no doubt that the provisions of the 
PLRA on which the defendants rely were meant to curb the 
substantively meritless prisoner claims that have swamped 
the federal courts. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 
(remarks of Sen. Kyl). But we are not aware of any specific 
support in the legislative history for the proposition that 
Congress also wanted the courts to dismiss claims that 
may have substantive merit but were inartfully pled. 
 
In sum, we hold that, under the circumstances presented 
here, a District Court must continue to follow the 
procedures mandated by our pre-PLRA cases. We note that 
the result we reach is consistent with decisions of the 
Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 
F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Gomez v. USAA 
Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999); Perkins 
v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 
1999).3 But see Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 
(6th Cir. 1999). Unlike those circuits, however, we limit our 
holding to the dismissal on motion of a complaint in a non- 
in-forma-pauperis case. 
 
III. 
 
The District Court in this case dismissed the plaintiffs' 
claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. In doing 
so, the court may have understandably thought that this 
procedure was mandated by the PLRA. We hold, however, 
that it is not and that now, as before, in the situation 
presented here, dismissal without leave to amend is 
justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, 
prejudice, or futility. The District Court did not test the 
plaintiffs' various claims against this standard, and we 
therefore vacate the order dismissing those claims and 
remand for the District Court to rule in the first instance on 
whether this standard is met. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See also Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (dictum); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(dictum). 
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